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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

IN ILLINOIS

Despite the fact that the above case has never been overruled, the committee drafting the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions formalized the instruction on the basis of the majority rule that requires a higher standard for
the specialist. 7 This is true since the Schierson case involved a license revocation and, therefore, can be distinguished on its facts from a negligence
action. Imposition of a higher standard on specialists, in a license revocation hearing, would cause a negligent act or omission to become gross malpractice, thus providing grounds for revocation. Yet, in a malpractice
damage suit, it is more equitable to hold the specialist to a higher standard,
especially considering increased specialization.
WILLIAM J. JOOST

SCHOOLS OF MEDICINE'
The majority of American courts have held that medical practitioners
2
are entitled to be judged according to their individual schools of medicine.
However, a school of medicine must have certain recognized tenets and be
followed by a respectable minority of the profession.3
Illinois recognizes the existence of different medical schools of thought
in its Medical Practice Act. 4 For example, chiropractors and osteopaths
are entitled to a limited medical practice under the Act.3 However, no discrimination in the administration of the Act is permitted against any
school, system, or method of medical practice.6
Despite legislative recognition of methods of treatment, and the strong
majority opinion to the contrary, the standard of care is the same for
7
anyone practicing medicine in Illinois, no matter what school is followed.
In Bacon v. Walsh, s the court stated that the defendant's case had not been
prejudiced by failure to show what school of medicine he followed. The
7

I.P.I. 105.02 (1961). See p. 108 of this symposium for the instruction generally given.

1 The term "schools of medicine" is used to denote methods or systems of treating
human disease as differentiated from the system of medicine practiced by physicians and
surgeons. It is not intended to include various techniques used by physicians and surgeons
in treating a given ailment.
2 Willet v. Rowekamp, 134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Atkinson v.
American School of Osteopathy, 240 Mo. 338, 144 S.W. 816 (1912); Nelson v. Dahl, 174
Minn. 574, 219 N.W. 941 (1928); Cummins v. Donley, 173 Kan. 463, 249 P.2d 695 (1952).
3 Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228 (1888).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91, Medical Practice Act (1959 as amended 1961, 1963, and 1965).
5 II. Rev. Stat. ch. 91 § 9a, Medical Practice Act (1959).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91 § 16e, Medical Practice Act (1959).
"The provisions of this Act shall not be so construed as to discriminate against any
system or method of treating human ailments . . ." 1923, June 30, Laws 1923, p. 436, § 20.
7 Bacon v. Walsh, 184 Ill. App. 377 (1913). Similar provisions to those noted supra
notes 5 and 6 were in existence when the case was decided under Medical Practice Act of
1899.
8 Ibid.
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court held, regardless of school of medicine followed, the standard of care
was that, "a physician and surgeon use that degree of professional knowledge, skill and care which the average physician and surgeon would ordinarily bring to a similar case under like circumstances in that locality." 9
Since this standard of care applies to all practice of medicine in Illinois,
the problem is to determine what the practice of medicine is. Osteopathy
has been referred to as the practice of medicine 0 and osteopaths are considered to be physicians if practicing with a license." Although the premise
of osteopathy is that human ailments are caused by the pressure of displaced bones on nerves and can be cured by manipulation, osteopaths will
be presumably judged by the universal standard of care that is applied to
physicians and surgeons. 12 Furthermore, any attempt at treatment outside
the limits of an osteopathic license subjects them to liability as an unqualified person. 13
A similar standard is applied to chiropractors since chiropractic treatment has been legislatively defined as the practice of medicine. 14
Naprapaths, who consider human ailments to be the result of strained
or contracted ligiments, have been judicially defined as practitioners of a
system of massage 15 and not practitioners of medicine. 16 Therefore, they
will not be judged by the same standard as those practicing medicine but
17
will be liable as an unqualified person.
WILLIAM J. JOOST

CONSENT
The relationship that exists beween a physician and patient can
probably be best described in the civil law term of consensual contract.
That is, a contract springs into existence through a mutual manifestation
of consent without the need for any formal offer, acceptance or consideration.
Despite the fact that no formalities are necessary, one essential element must be present-consent. The physician exposes himself to suits
for technical batteries by treating a person without consent or in excess of
Supra note 7, at 379.
10 People ex rel State Board of Health v. Gordon, 194 Ill. 560, 62 N.E. 858 (1902).
11 People ex rel Gage v. Simon, 278 111. 256, 115 N.E. 817 (1917).
12 Supra note 7.
13 Williams v. Piontkowski, 337 Ill. App. 101, 84 N.E.2d 843 (1st Dist. 1949). Thus.
the chiropractor or osteopath is faced with the dilemma of being judged by the principles
of physicians and surgeons if he practices within the confines of his license or goes beyond
it.
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91 § 9a Medical Practice Act (1959).
15 People v. Mattel, 313 111. App. 259, 39 N.E.2d 689 (2d Dist. 1942).
16 People v. Mainard, 348 Ill. App. 53, 107 N.E.2d 878 (3d Dist. 1952).
17 Supra note 13.
9

